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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of luck, de￿ned as global economic growth, and
competence, de￿ned as the di⁄erence between domestic and world growth, on voting in
general elections since 1960. The vote of incumbent parties of the right is found to be
sensitive to luck, whereas that of incumbent parties of the left is not. This is consistent
with the Clientele Hypothesis given electorates which fail to perfectly distinguish luck
from competence. Economic competence plays a strong role in determining the vote,
especially in high-income democracies. The electoral reward to competence is essen-
tially equal across parties of either ideology, contra to the Saliency Hypothesis. The
data are also supportive of the Territory Hypothesis, namely that greater ideological
territory increases a party￿ s relative vote share.
JEL subject code: D72
Keywords: voting, ideology, luck, competence1 Introduction
Political scientists and journalists agree on few things, but they do agree that incumbent
politicians bene￿t from favorable economic conditions. However, the mechanisms through
which this process works are not wholly understood. Following recent work we distinguish
between economic luck, measured as world growth, and economic competence, measured
as the di⁄erence between domestic and world growth. Luck a⁄ects the vote of incumbent
parties asymmetrically, depending on their ideological position, whereas we ￿nd the e⁄ect of
competence is symmetric.
At ￿rst sight the ￿nding that luck, as de￿ned above, explains the vote sits awkwardly with
the rational choice literature. Why should voters reward, or punish, incumbent politicians for
outcomes beyond their control? Leigh (2004) and Wolfers (2002) explain this as the outcome
of quasi-rational voting: voters attribute competence when outcomes are in fact driven by
luck. As Leigh (2004) observes, citing Mulligan and Hunter (2001), voters may be rationally
ignorant when the chance that their vote will in￿ uence the outcome is negligible, and the
costs of becoming informed are tangible. Rationally ignorant voters fail to distinguish luck
from competence and the upshot is that luck bene￿ts incumbents regardless of ideological
persuasion.
On the other hand voters may in fact have good reason to vote according to the global
economic climate. In the political science literature the Clientele Hypothesis has it that
particular parties bene￿t electorally given particular economic circumstances. A variant of
this is that parties of the right do well when the world economy is booming. Freer trade,
lower taxes and greater competition seem a⁄ordable, and the right is seen as more likely
1to deliver them. Conversely the left do well in times of slower global growth or recession.
Protectionism, expansionary domestic demand and larger government are now the order of
the day. Accordingly the vote of the right positively correlates whereas the vote of the left
negatively correlates with luck.
The arguments of the previous two paragraphs are not mutually exclusive, and putting
them together means that one should expect a stronger relationship between luck and the
incumbents￿vote share when the incumbent is from the right rather than the left. Using
data from general elections around the world we ￿nd evidence to support this hypothesis.
Right-wing incumbents￿vote shares signi￿cantly and positively depend on luck, whereas the
vote share of left-wing incumbents is statistically unresponsive.
Leigh (2004) ￿nds that competence plays an increasing role in determining incumbents￿
re-election chances as the level of income and education levels increases. Voting is thus
argued to have become increasingly rational as economies have developed. We extend this
analysis by asking whether party ideology also a⁄ects the responsiveness of incumbents￿
vote shares to competence. This too is embedded in political science theory. The Saliency
Hypothesis holds that parties are judged di⁄erently depending on particular outcomes. If
employment and economic growth are the salient issues for parties of the left, then the
electoral reward to leftist incumbents depends particularly on whether or not the economy
expands on their watch. In contrast the salient issue for right wing regimes, traditionally at
least, has been in￿ ation. If such governments successfully bring down in￿ ation, it is likely
that their vote would be less responsive to economic expansion, given that de￿ ationary
policy is contractionary, necessarily so if achieved through demand management. Hence the
incumbent￿ s competence might sway more votes either way when that incumbent is on the
2left.
We do ￿nd that some types of voter respond more than others to the competence of
any party in government; left-wingers more than right-wingers and rich-country voters more
than poor-country voters. But none of this alters our ￿nding that in terms of their lead in
votes (positive or negative) left- and right-wing governments get the same electoral payback
from the same level of competence.
To measure ideological position we utilize data from the Comparative Manifestos Project.
The data (described in more detail below) provide party speci￿c ideology measures on a single
left-right dimension varying election by election. These data also allow us to investigate how
ideological platforms themselves determine the vote and this is the ￿nal research objective of
the paper. In particular we ask whether parties converge, and also whether greater ideological
territory gains votes. There is little evidence of ideological convergence, though we do ￿nd
that greater ideological territory increases a party￿ s vote. Centralization brings a small but
tangible electoral reward.
In the next section we delve in more detail into the extensive previous literature on how
economic performance and indeed ideology a⁄ects the vote, and propose testable hypotheses
following from this literature. Following this the data used in the empirical work are de￿ned
in detail in section 3. Section 4 presents the econometric ￿ndings and section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Predictions
Connections between the economy and elections have been examined at length in both the
economics and political science literature. In economics research has focussed upon political
3business cycles (PBCs), either motivated opportunistically (Nordhaus, 1975) or through price
and wage rigidities and partisan policy (Alesina, 1988). Alesina et al (1997) ￿nd persuasive
evidence for the existence of PBCs across OECD countries.
Whereas the PBC literature asks how and whether elections a⁄ect the economy the focus
of the political science literature is on how and whether the economy a⁄ects elections. The
theory and evidence of ￿ Economic Voting￿was addressed in a special issue of Electoral Studies
in 2000, summarized by Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) who describe the substantial evidence
supporting the Responsibility Hypothesis - that voters reward (or punish) incumbents for
good (or bad) economic performance as measured by outcomes in unemployment/growth and
in￿ ation. However, this evidence begets further questions. Firstly is the performance-reward
relationship symmetric across parties? That is, do left-wing incumbents enjoy the same
reward at the ballot for good economic performance as right-wing incumbents? Second do
voters reward performance whether externally induced via luck or internally driven through
competence? Third, and following from the ￿rst two sets of questions, are the rewards to
luck and competence themselves symmetric?
There are possible theoretical arguments that the answer to the ￿rst of these questions
is no. The Clientele Hypothesis advocated by Rattinger (1991) and Swank (1993) posits
forward-looking behavior: left-wing parties are elected to deal with unemployment (because
they are seen as more competent or enthusiastic at tackling it) while right-wing ones are
voted in to deal with in￿ ation. Thus it might be that the left is credited with an ideological
(Keynesian) toolkit which enables expansionary policy. A variant of this line is that part
of the right are popular during times of low unemployment for their perceived tax-cutting
credentials. Either way di⁄erent parties harvest votes from di⁄erent situations.
4Alternatively, the Saliency Hypothesis advocated by Powell and Whitten (1993) holds
that left- (right-) wing governments are punished more severely for high unemployment
(in￿ ation). Here voters are backward-looking; if governments were elected, perhaps or in part
due to the Clientele Hypothesis, i.e. to resolve a particular issue, then it seems reasonable
to suppose that the electoral response to particular outcomes might be asymmetric. If left-
wing regimes are elected to be expansionary, then performance would be adjudged on this
criterion. If right-wing regimes are elected to suppress in￿ ation, then it might be expected
that such regimes￿electoral reward from economic growth is reduced. Growth is salient to
the left, less so the right.
Carlsen (2000) presents empirical work using popularity data for incumbent parties from
the left and right in four separate countries. Interestingly in￿ ation was found to have no
signi￿cant e⁄ect on incumbent popularity. However, right-wing governments were found to
be particularly hurt by unemployment, whereas left-wing governments were again apparently
immune to this. There is thus some evidence in support of the Clientele Hypothesis, and
against the saliency e⁄ect, where the left are supposed to be punished hardest for unem-
ployment. The problem with this approach however, is that it fails to distinguish between
economic performance brought about through fortuitous external conditions and that due
to competent management of the economy. In other words there is potential measurement
error in the key explanatory variables.
It is this problem that inspired the second strand of literature. Thus Leigh (2004) sep-
arates out the impact of ￿ luck￿and ￿ competence￿in economic management. In the simplest
speci￿cation these are de￿ned as growth in world GDP and the di⁄erence between domestic
and world growth over the previous term of o¢ ce. As Leigh points out, there may be good
5reasons for supposing that voters may be "quasi-rational", i.e. rationally ignorant when in-
formation collection and processing is costly and the tangible bene￿ts of voting are so small.
Given this, voters might fail to distinguish between luck and competence. His empirical
analysis ￿nds that both luck and competence make an incumbent￿ s re-election more likely.
Luck always plays a substantial part, while competence becomes increasingly important in
more developed economies. Leigh concludes from this that voters become more rational with
greater economic development. In other applications Wolfers (2002) and Achen and Bartels
(2004) also ￿nd evidence that voters reward or punish incumbents for events surely beyond
their control.
The third set of questions connects the research of the two strands of literature identi￿ed
above, and represents the main agenda of this paper. As stated above our interpretation of
the Clientele Hypothesis is that it postulates that particular parties bene￿t from particular
circumstances. A possible variant of this is that parties of left and right bene￿t asymmet-
rically from global economic circumstances, i.e. luck, in Leigh￿ s formulation. In times of
strong global economic growth there are gains from increased trade; electorates might be
expected to approve policies attracting foreign direct investment for example through tax
breaks, or improving competitiveness through generalized tax cuts. In times of weak global
growth the appropriate policy mix might be more protectionist, or require greater domestic
intervention. Indeed, in a careful analysis Bohara and Kaempfer (1991) ￿nd persuasive evi-
dence that protectionism is countercyclical - i.e. that trade barriers tend to increase during
recessions, and fall during booms. Following from this, a testable hypothesis is that luck
bene￿ts the right, but harms the left.
However, luck will bene￿t parties of all ideological persuasion, so far as voters fail to
6disentangle luck from competence. Quasi-rational voting therefore ampli￿es the e⁄ect of
luck on right-wing regimes, but dampens its e⁄ect on left-wing ones. This reasoning is
summarized in the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The e⁄ect of luck on right-wing regimes￿vote is unambiguously
positive.
Hypothesis 2. The e⁄ect of luck on left-wing regimes￿vote may be positive
or negative.
Conversely our interpretation of the Saliency Hypothesis is that it is more closely aligned
with competence. Incumbents￿competency is judged on their performance in dealing with
the particular economic issues they were elected to resolve. If, as has been suggested, growth
is a more salient issue for left-wing regimes, then their electoral reward following high growth
relative to the world should be greater than that for right-wing regimes, for whom growth
is less salient. The resultant hypotheses to be taken to the data are:
Hypothesis 3. The e⁄ect of left-wing competence on the vote of the left (right)
vote is positive (negative).
Hypothesis 4. The e⁄ect of right-wing competence on the vote of the right
(left) is positive (negative) but weaker than that of left-wing competence.
Hypotheses 1-4 represent the main research thrust of the paper. Nonetheless, the ideol-
ogy data employed in this paper (described in section 3) also permit empirical examination
of theoretical models of spatial political competition. The seminal model of this literature
is the median voter model, posited by Downs (1957), with antecedents in Condorcet (1785),
Hotelling (1929), Bowen (1943) and Black (1948). Congleton (2002) and Holcombe (1989)
survey some of the vast subsequent literature. In its simplest guise, with two parties, a
7unidimensional policy space and single-peaked preferences, voters succumb to the will of
the median voter and parties are rewarded electorally for centralizing. The result that both
parties converge in the centre we term the Convergence Hypothesis. There is a fair amount of
popular sympathy for this idea; an often heard criticism of political parties in Anglo-Saxon
countries at least is that parties are indistinguishable from one another. Nonetheless, empir-
ical research often ￿nds that there are systematic party di⁄erences, as found e.g. in the US
by Ansolabehere et al (2001) and Poole and Rosenthal (1984 and 1997) and internationally
within analyses of Manifesto content (Budge et al, 1987).
But in theory as well as practice there are many reasons why convergence may not hold.
In an extensive analysis Cox (1990) argues that divergence can occur given certain features of
the electoral law, for example the size of electoral districts. Similarly Grofman (2004) argues
that the simple Downsian model, at least as commonly depicted, is in fact a very special
case, resting on at least 15 separate assumptions and that divergence should be expected
in general, even in strictly unidimensional two-party political competition. For example,
elections following a two-stage process where candidates or party positions are selected in
the ￿rst stage by party members who are not randomly drawn from the population would
be expected to produce divergent platforms (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1972). There may
therefore be centrifugal forces taking parties away from the median voter.1
Whatever the mechanism determining the party platform, a central tenet running through
the literature is that ideological position a⁄ects the vote. A simple way of getting a testable
hypothesis is to assume unidimensional two-party competition and a uniform distribution
1The spatial theory is criticized at a fundamental level by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) and Mac-
donald et al (1991), who instead propose a directional theory of voting. Nonetheless spatial theories still
occupy a central place in political theory, and are defended by Westholm (1997).
8of preferences. The midpoint between the positions taken by the two parties would de￿ne
the indi⁄erent voter. Voters to her left would vote for the left-wing party, and voters to her
right would vote for the right-wing party. Parties which occupy more ideological territory
on the left-right continuum will win more votes. We call this the Territory Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5. Parties￿vote shares are increasing in their ideological territory.
There are good theoretical arguments both for and against the Territory Hypothesis. If
parties want to increase their turnout by appealing to their core constituency, that undercuts
the convergence hypothesis.2 If the strategy works, it undercuts the territory hypothesis as
well. Third parties location decisions will impact upon the two main parties in ways that
may weaken the convergence hypothesis (though not necessarily the territory hypothesis.)3
The assumption of unidimensional politics is also questionable.4 There are in short a great
many reasons to expect variety in policy platforms, and indeed ideological territory. In fact
there are so many such factors at play that this variety itself takes highly various forms. All
this gives us the more reason to test Hypothesis 5.
In the next section the data used to examine these hypotheses are described. Section 4
2A related literature addresses the question of the ￿ paradox of voting￿i.e. the disconsonance between
costly voting and neglible bene￿ts when the chances of decisively impacting the election are vanishing small.
e.g. see Aldrich (1997) and Dhillon and Peralta (2002). Of course, this argument applies even when parties
are distinguishable. When they both occupy the centre ground then turnout is especially mysterious.
3For example, a vote-maximising Social Democratic party may be pushed out to the ￿ ank in the presence
of a centralist Liberal third party. On the other hand the presence of a Socialist third party may push it
towards the center.
4The limitations of a uni-dimensional analysis must be acknowledged, but there is widespread recognition
of the existence of a meaningful left-right ideological dimension. In theoretical models multi-dimensionality
frequently brings with it instability (e.g. McKelvey (1976)) whilst as Grofman (2004) observes policy posi-
tions taken in practice are more predictable than implied by this. Empirically Poole and Rosenthal (1991)
argue that roll-call voting in the US is characterised by a singular ￿ predominant major dimension￿ . Fur-
thermore a central argument of the Comparative Manifestos Project, which we draw upon for our empirical
research, is that their left-right measure is a meaningful predictor of actual party policy.
9presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
3 Data
The vote share and ideology data analyzed in this paper come from the Comparative Man-
ifestos Project (CMP) as described in Mapping Policy Preferences I and II authored re-
spectively by Budge et. al (2001) and Klingemann et. al. (2006). This database contains
vote share data as well as detailed policy platform data ascertained from party manifestos
for lower house5 general elections. The original source covers 25 established democracies for
the period 1945-1998, and following the wave of democratization in transition economies the
sequel extends this to 51 countries since 1990 through elections held in the early 2000s. In
sum these sources provide voting and policy platform data for 488 general elections, of which
404 are from the countries covered in the original dataset and the remaining 84 are from the
new democracies.
Following the hypotheses proposed above we take the two parties with the largest vote
share in each election and denote these shares VL and VR respectively for the left- and right-
wing parties, and de￿ne an additional dependent variable lead = VL ￿ VR. Identi￿cation of
left and right follows from the CMP estimated right-left ideological positions for the major
political parties at each election, denoted rile. These series lie on an interval between ￿100,
with ￿100 representing the extreme left and +100 representing the extreme right.6 The
5Excepting the United States, where presidential elections are the unit of observation.
6The rile series are the principal output of the CMP research project and are "reliable and valid" according
to the original authors when compared against expert opinion and mass perceptions data. These data have
been used in a variety of di⁄erent settings. For example McDonald et al (2004) ￿nd that parliaments with
both single member districts and proportional regimes correspond to the preferences of the median voter.
10largest two parties￿ideology data are denoted rileL and rileR respectively, with rileL ￿ rileR.
These data are transformed onto the unit interval, i.e. ti = (rilei + 100)/200 for i = L;R
and the midpoint between tL and tR is used to measure the relative territory occupied by the
left-wing party, speci￿cally territory = (tL + tR)/2. Low values for territory correspond to
elections where the midpoint between the two parties is towards the left, hence the ideological
spectrum occupied by the party of the left is smaller. High values for territory correspond
to elections where the ideological spectrum spanned by the party of the left is greater.
The CMP data set also classi￿es parties by ￿ party families￿ . Speci￿cally these families
are de￿ned as Ecology, (former) Communist, Social Democrat, Liberal, Christian Democrat,
Conservative, National, Agrarian, Ethnic and Regional and Special Interest parties. But
in the vast majority of elections under consideration the two largest parties always belong
to either the Communist, Social Democrat, Liberal, Christian Democrat or Conservative
family, and it is fair to say that in this sequence, at least approximately, this set of families
does follow a left to right continuum. Indeed, in 402 out of the 488 elections the rile
measure is consistent with this argument. In what follows we restrict the analysis to these
402 observations.7
The economic data used in this paper are constructed following Leigh (2004) who de-
7There are therefore 86 elections where parties that would traditionally (at least according to the family
party identi￿cation) be classed as relatively left but are according to the CMP ideology measures actually
relatively right of their principle competitors. An inspection of these cases reveals elections that would appear
not to be fought along traditional ideological lines. One such example is Ireland where the two main parties
are Fine Gael (classed as Christian Democrat), and Fianna Fail (classed as Conservative). According to
their familial identities Fine Gael is left of Fianna Fail, though the ideology measure frequently reverses
this. A further 30 out of these 86 elections are from the new democracies. This is a disproportionately large
share, indicating that elections in these countries frequently have not been fought along traditional right-left
ideological lines. When these observations are included in the analysis signi￿cance levels are a little reduced,
though the main ￿ndings detailed below are robust to their inclusion.
11composes macroeconomic performance into measures for ￿ luck￿and ￿ competence￿ . Annual
GDP per capita growth data at World and country level comes from the World Development
Indicators 2007 database (WDI). In the simple speci￿cation ￿ luck￿is based on average World
growth (following Leigh denoted as DW) in the previous regime. Thus for example in the
2004 US election this is measured as the average growth rate of World GDP per capita in the
years 2001-4 inclusive. This luck measure is attributed to the Republicans (as incumbents),
whereas for that term the Democrats are attributed a zero luck measure. On the other hand
￿ competence￿is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between country-speci￿c growth (denoted as DY )
and world growth over the same period. The WDI data start in most cases in 1960, though
there are a small number of later observations for which data aren￿ t available. Some elec-
tions are quite close to one another, so that attributing full macroeconomic responsibility is
problematic. For this reason we exclude elections within a year of the previous election.8
Using the WDI data we constructed data for DW and DY for each of the regimes for
which data are available. To translate these data into measures for luck and competence for
both parties we use indicator variables, DL
it;DR
it set equal to 1 if the party of the left or right





















8So for example the Australia 1984 election is excluded because the previous election took place in 1983.
9To identify whether or not the party was in o¢ ce during the previous regime we used the data of
Waldendorp et al (1998) and for more recent elections the World Bank￿ s Database of Political Institutions.
12and these new variables are used in the regression analysis below. Table 1 contains summary
statistics for these measures, showing as would be expected quite a lot more variation in
competence than in luck.
Table 1 shows that the mean value for territory is very close to 0:5, indicating that
on average at least, ideological territory is shared equally across the two largest parties in
each election. However, the territory series also vary quite substantially, ranging from 0:310
(Finland, 1987) to 0:822 (Iceland, 1974). Of course, the observation that the centre point
between the two largest parties is very low (or very high) will to an extent re￿ ect conditions
in that particular country at that particular time. The Finnish (Icelandic) median voter
may well be positioned considerably below (above) 0:5, and parties, if choosing ideology so
as to maximize vote share might be expected to vary their positions accordingly. Similarly,
median voters in the 1960s may have been leftward of their counterparts in the 1980s. The
empirical work below includes country ￿xed e⁄ects as well as year dummies to address this
issue. Moreover, if it is the case that the territory measure is just capturing the actual
mid-point of the electorate, then the empirical analysis should not unearth a relationship
between vote shares and the territory.
Table 1 also contains descriptive statistics of the underlying CMP ideology data, rileL
and rileR. The mean distance between the ideological position of the two parties is 27.9, a
substantial margin and ￿nding against the simple Convergence Hypothesis. Figure 1 presents
density plots of these data and shows systematic di⁄erences between the two distributions.
There is some overlap, a re￿ ection of the fact that the underlying ideological climate varies
across time and space, but the important point is that persistent and meaningful di⁄erences
appear to be the rule rather than the exception. The ￿nding of divergence corroborates
13Ansolabehere et al (2001) and Poole and Rosenthal (1984 and 1997).
4 Analysis
This section presents the results testing the hypotheses proposed above. As a starting point
the following regression is estimated:









where leadit is the lead of the left-wing party over the right-wing party in country i in
election t and the explanatory variables are as described above. "it is an error variable which
comprises ￿xed e⁄ects, time e⁄ects and white noise. Inference concerning hypotheses 1-5
(henceforth denoted H1-H5) follow from the estimated values for coe¢ cients ￿1 ￿ ￿5.
Column (1) of Table 2 presents the results of this regression. Consistent with H1 and
H2 the impact of luck is found to be asymmetric, with the relative vote depending strongly
on luck when enjoyed by right-wing incumbents, but statistically no relationship with luck
following left-wing regimes. Following a one standard deviation increase in world growth
the relative left-wing vote deteriorates by 2.1% when right-wing incumbents have held o¢ ce.
Paradoxically, left wing incumbents are apparently punished for presiding during times of
strong world growth (though this is statistically insigni￿cant). Our interpretation of this
is that the clientele e⁄ects are at least as strong as the impact of quasi-rational voting as
argued by Leigh. Strong world growth bene￿ts the right, and especially so when they have
held o¢ ce.
14This same regression ￿nds the impact of competence, whether exhibited by left or right,
to be sizeable and statistically signi￿cant. A one standard deviation increase in competence
shown by left-wing incumbents yields a lead in votes of 3.4%. Similarly a one standard
deviation increase in competence shown by right-wing government reduces lead by 3.6%,
hence pointing to virtual symmetry in this regard. In this regression there is strong support
for H3, though no evidence of the asymmetry proposed in H4.
Finally the parameter estimate for territory is positive and signi￿cant at the 10% level.
Taking the point estimate, then a one standard deviation increase in ideological territory
increase the relative vote of the left by 1.4%. There is thus some support for a small electoral
reward for centralizing as suggested in H5.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 contain separate regression results using the vote of
the largest left- and right-wing party as the dependent variable. As in column (1) external
circumstances favour the right over the left. Looking ￿rst at column (2) there is no statistical
relationship between the vote of the left and luck, whether enjoyed by previous left- or right-
wing regimes, consistent with H2. On the other hand in column (3) the relationship between
the vote of the right and their own luck is positive and statistically signi￿cant at the 2%
level, consistent with H1.
However, the vote of the left is found to be much more sensitive to competence, whether
attributable to the left or the right. A one standard deviation increase in compL increase
the left vote by 2.8% whilst a one standard deviation decrease in compR yields 2.4% for the
left. The ￿rst of these ￿gures is consistent with H3, but the second contradicts H4, which
proposed that voters across the spectrum were signi￿cantly less swayed by the government￿ s
competence (as de￿ned here) when that government was on the right. Moreover, in column
15(3) whilst the estimated signs for compL and compR are as would be expected the parameter
estimates themselves are not statistically signi￿cant. It would appear that the vote of the
right is relatively immune to variation in competence, whether exhibited by either side.
Overall the results suggest that ￿ oating voters reward or punish the left following revealed
competency by either party by switching between voting for the left and either abstaining
or voting for a third party. The vote of the left is sensitive to competence, whilst the vote
of the right is not. But competence on the left determines no more votes than competence
on the right.10
Table 3 presents regression results for subsamples splitting the data into elections before
and after 1987 and above and below median income.11 The impact of world growth (luck)
occurring during the tenure of left-wing regimes generally has little impact on lead, regardless
of the subsample. The interesting exception is in the high income subsample, when luck is
clearly a misnomer, as there is a negative relationship, signi￿cant at the 10% level. As
above, we interpret this as evidence in favour of the clientele hypothesis: world growth, even
when presided over by left-wing regimes, tends to bene￿t the right. On the other hand the
impact of world growth occurring during the tenure of right-wing regimes is estimated to
have a negative relationship with lead in all four subsamples. In the pre-1987 and high-
income subsamples this relationship is signi￿cant at the 5% level. The evidence on luck in
10There is a possible rationale for this. If the right-wing party is thought to be uninterested in or bad
at providing full employment that means (i) that left-wing voters will not be attracted to it even if ￿ their
own￿government fails here (ii) that right-wing voters will be the sort of people not very interested in full
employment in the ￿rst place and thus indi⁄erent to either side￿ s success in providing it. So the left vote may
gravitate between the Left party and some ￿ third way￿ , including abstention, while the right vote remains
stable and impervious.
111987 is the median election year in the dataset for which economic data are available. Median income,
in terms of PPP converted real GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables is $10,561.87.
16the subsamples again supports H1 and H2.
The results of Table 3 also point towards a clear pattern in how lead responds to compe-
tence. In the subsample of elections prior to 1987 and the low income subsample competence
plays no part in driving election results. But in the later period and the high income sub-
samples competence is statistically signi￿cant, whether exhibited by the left or the right. It
is also quite sizeable, for example in the high income subsample a one standard deviation
increase in competence, whether exhibited by left or right, increases lead by around 7-8%.
This is entirely consistent with Leigh (2004) who also ￿nds that the rewards to competence
are higher in countries that are richer and better educated. It may be that in these circum-
stances the electorate has better access to information and votes accordingly. These results
certainly support H3, though again there is no evidence of a weaker e⁄ect of competence by
right-wing incumbents, as proposed in H4.
The subsample analysis ￿nds that the impact of territory is statistically signi￿cant only
in the high income subsample (at the 5% level). Using the point estimate in Column (4) a
one standard increase in territory yields a 2.9% increase in lead, consistent with H5. The
explanation for this might mirror the arguments relating to competence above. As electorates
become more sophisticated, they become more aware of and therefore more responsive to
ideological position. However, as has already been discussed, there are multiple reasons to
expect a di⁄use relationship between ideological territory and the vote, and these deeper
determinants are likely to be di⁄erent in the di⁄erent subsamples.
Table 4 breaks down the results of column (4) in Table 3. Competence again is found
to be a signi￿cant determinant of voting for the left, and in contrast with Table 2 is now
a signi￿cant determinant of voting for the right. If anything these results suggest greater
17sensitivity to compR rather than compL, contrary to H4, although the di⁄erences in the coef-
￿cients are not statistically signi￿cant. On the other hand the impact of the world economy
is quite robust: the party of the left does not bene￿t from favorable external circumstances
whereas the party of the right does. A one standard deviation increase in world growth if
anything marginally reduces the vote of left-wing incumbents, whereas it provides around a
2.5-3.5% bonus to incumbent parties of the right. In column (1) the vote of the main party
of the left is found to be strongly related to ideological territory, whereas the vote of the
right negatively related to territory, although in this case the estimated coe¢ cient is not
statistically signi￿cant.
Finally, a large number of the elections in the CMP sample take place either in the same
year, or the year immediately following the preceding election. The analysis of the economic
determinants necessarily excludes these observations, but it is worth examining H5 alone
including these additional elections. Table 5 contains regression results for the full data, and
￿nds a signi￿cant statistical association between lead and the ideology measures. In Column
(1) the parameter estimate territory is positive and statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level,
consistent with H5. Using these estimates a one standard deviation increase in ideological
territory yields the left-wing party (and by symmetry the right-wing party) an additional
lead of 2.4% of the vote.
Ideological territory itself is constructed from the ideological position taken by both
parties, and Column (2) of Table 5 presents the results of a regression with both parties￿
positions individually represented. The Territory Hypothesis would have it that the left-wing
vote lead should be increasing in both the ideological position of the left and right parties.
An increase in rileL moves the left-wing party to the centre, and an increase in rileR moves
18the right-wing party towards its ￿ ank. Consistent with this both parameters are found to
be positive and both signi￿cant at the 10% level. The dependent variable is approximately
symmetrically a⁄ected by the ideological position of both parties. Individually the e⁄ects
are borderline signi￿cant, but taken together are suggestive that territory is a signi￿cant
determinant of the relative vote in the full sample including all elections.
Overall the empirical analysis generates a number of new ￿ndings. The strongest result
is the ￿nding that favorable external circumstances bene￿t rightwing incumbents much more
strongly than leftwing incumbents. This ￿nding is consistent with the Clientele Hypothesis.
A global upturn may lead voters to swing rightward, perhaps to promote trade. Similarly a
global downturn may lead voters to swing leftward, so as to expand the economy, or indeed
extend protectionism. The important quali￿cation that this relationship is not symmetric
can be explained by the argument that parties of either ideological persuasion are to an
extent rewarded by luck, due to quasi-rational voting as advocated by Leigh (2004). There
is also strong support for the argument that economic competence in￿ uences the vote, and
that this increases with economic development. We conjectured that the Saliency Hypothesis
would result in voters responding more to leftwing than to rightwing competency. In the
full sample the actual vote of the left itself was found to be more sensitive to competence,
and the right not. In the subsample of richer countries the vote of both left and right
alike responded to competence, exhibited by left and right, in a manner consistent with
fully rational voting. But, the important point is that in all cases parties lead in votes was
equally sensitive to the competence of left and right governments. From this we agree with
Carlsen (2000) that saliency arguments do not determine voting behavior. Lastly, while
the results pertaining to the ideology measures are not always uniform, there is at least a
19recurring suggestion that ideological territory plays a role in determining the vote. In all of
the regressions the estimated sign on territory is consistent with the Territory Hypothesis,
and in the full sample of elections and in particular the subsample of high income countries,
the relationship is statistically signi￿cant.
5 Conclusions
This paper combines two separate strands of the economic and political science literature
addressing the links between the economy and elections. The ￿rst of these strands, from
political science, proposes reasons to expect asymmetry in how the vote responds to the
overall state of the economy depending on party ideology. The Clientele Hypothesis holds
that voters will gravitate towards particular parties for particular problems. The Saliency
Hypothesis holds that particular parties get di⁄erent electoral rewards for the same events.
The second of these strands, from economics and the public choice school of politics, addresses
the extent to which voters are rational. In particular this strand asks whether and how
voters distinguish between economic luck, as de￿ned by world circumstances, and economic
competence, de￿ned by the di⁄erence between domestic and global performance.
The argument of this paper is that both streams o⁄er important insights. Given this, then
particular hypotheses suggest themselves, which to date have not been formally empirically
examined, and which have been the focus of this paper. Firstly we argue, and ￿nd, that the
impact of the world economy is quite asymmetric in its e⁄ects upon the vote of incumbents
from the left and right. Left-wing incumbents do not bene￿t from world growth, whereas
right-wing incumbents gain around a 3% electoral bonus from a one standard deviation
20increase in world growth. This ￿nding can be explained taking the Clientele Hypothesis
together with the established argument of quasi-rational voting. World growth bene￿ts both
parties so far as voters do not distinguish between competence and luck. However, voters
may also drift to the right during global good times (they might for instance become keener
on free trade) and to the left during bad times. This would serve to negate the impact of
luck upon left-wing regimes whilst augmenting its impact upon the right.
Secondly, we ￿nd that economic competence has a highly signi￿cant and sizeable e⁄ect
upon voting. These e⁄ects are strongest in the high-income subsample, with competence
approximately equally important to left and right alike. In these countries a one standard
deviation increase in competence by the left (right) increases (decreases) the lead of the
party of the left over the right by around 7-8%. Theories of political saliency suggest reasons
to expect di⁄erent responses to competence depending on the identity of the incumbent,
but we ￿nd no evidence for this. Interestingly, we ￿nd in the full sample that the vote of
the left is especially responsive to competence of either type of incumbent whereas the vote
of the right is statistically unresponsive. But this particular form of asymmetry is distinct
from that proposed from the Saliency Hypothesis. Quite why ￿ oating voters move towards
(away from) the left away from (towards) 3rd parties or abstention rather than the main
party of the right in response to competence, and quite why right-wing voters are apparently
unresponsive to competence isn￿ t entirely clear, but certainly this is what the data suggests
in the full sample. In the subsample of high-income elections even this form of asymmetry
disappears and both parties are rewarded in an identical form for competence.
Finally, and following much of the theoretical political competition literature, we argue
for a role for ideology. More ideological territory seems to mean more votes. Whilst it must
21be recognized that this result is somewhat fragile there is consistent support for the Territory
Hypothesis. In the full sample, and the subsample of rich countries, territory is found to
be a sizeable determinant of the vote. A one standard deviation increase in ideological
territory increase the vote lead by 2-3%. So why do parties not centralize if it is electorally
advantageous to do so? There are many answers to this question. The procedures by which
parties choose their platform are by no means guaranteed to accomplish the objective of
maximizing votes. Factions, interest groups and intra-party bargaining mechanisms may
all distort the process. Parties may prefer principle to electoral convenience. Future work
could address this question, but as long as platform-setting is not immutably tied to vote-
maximization then centralization is not inevitable.
22Table 1: Descriptive Statistics obs* mean standard deviation range
compL 117 0:437 2:339 ￿12:82;5:37
compR 139 0:462 2:822 ￿16:36;8:59
luckL 117 1:941 0:989 ￿0:689;4:350
luckR 139 1:810 1:130 ￿0:689;3:962
territory 402 0:495 0:077 0:310;0:822
rileL 402 ￿14:842 16:571 ￿61:4;46:7
rileR 402 13:011 19:222 ￿33:3;82:2
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. obs de￿nes number of observations.
For the measures of competence and luck these describe the number of non-zero observations.
There are a total of 250 elections for which the economic data are available, 117 (139) of
which were contested by left- (right-) wing incumbents. In 28 elections both major parties
were incumbents as part of coalition governments. In 22 elections neither of the two largest
parties contested as incumbents.
23Table 2 (1) (2) (3)

































Country Fixed E⁄ects yes yes yes
Time E⁄ects yes yes yes
R2 0:72 0:82 0:77
Sample all all all
Countries 40 40 40
Elections 250 250 250
Note: All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors. Tables report coe¢ cient
estimates and standard errors in parentheses. ￿￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at the 1% level, ￿￿
denotes signi￿cance at the 5% level and ￿ denotes signi￿cance at the 10% level.
24Table 3 (1) (2) (3) (4)














































Country Fixed E⁄ects yes yes yes yes
Time E⁄ects yes yes yes yes
R2 0:83 0:71 0:92 0:73
Sample pre-1987 1987 onwards low income high income
Countries 25 41 43 33
Elections 120 130 125 125
25Table 4 (1) (2)

























Country Fixed E⁄ects yes yes
Time E⁄ects yes yes
R2 0:90 0:82
Sample high income high income
Countries 33 33
Elections 125 125
26Table 5 (1) (2)










Country Fixed E⁄ects yes yes





27Figure 1: Density plots of rileL and rileR.
Figure 1 contains kernel density plots of rileL and rileR for 402 general elections, com-
puted by Stata.
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